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The Midnight Ride of Kwame Nkrumah and Other Fables 
of Bandung (Ban-doong) 
Robert Vitalis 
 
The battle against colonialism has been a long one, and do you know that today is a famous 
anniversary in that battle? On the eighteenth day of April, on thousand seven hundred and 
seventy five, just one hundred and eighty years ago, Paul Revere rode at midnight through the 
New England countryside, warning of the approach of British troops and of the opening of the 
American War of Independence, the first successful anti-colonial war in history. About this 
midnight ride the poet Longfellow wrote: 
 
A cry of defiance, and not of fear,   
A voice in the darkness, a knock at the door,   
And a word that shall echo for evermore!1 
 
Two conferences were held at Bandung in April 1955. One was the real conference, about which 
not very much is known, about which people care even less, and which has faded away like a 
bad dream. The other was a quite different conference, a crystallization of what people wanted to 
believe had happened which, as a myth, took on reality in the Bandung Principles and, later, in 
the Bandung Spirit. The real conference aroused interest mainly because it contributed towards 
the solution of a crisis then much in the news but which history scarcely troubles to record.2 
 
Myths or the identity stories a group tells about itself are found not just in grade school 
primers or nationalist tracts but also in advanced scholarship, in professional journals, and in 
conference papers. In 2005, the fiftieth anniversary of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, 
Indonesia I attended a combined session of the Middle East and African Studies Associations 
titled “Bandung at 50: Histories of Resistance and Legacies of Solidarities.” Adnan A. Husain and 
Rabab Abdulhadi organized the session, reprising one they put together earlier at the World 
Social Forum in Porto Alegre, Brazil. One of the panel members, Poonam Arora, a specialist in 
                                                      
Author’s Note: I wrote the first draft of this paper for the February 2009 Columbia University 
Workshop, “Contending with the Superpowers: The Non-Aligned Movement in the 
Mediterranean,” the first research and writing I did following my father’s death the previous 
summer. I am grateful to Victoria de Grazia for giving me a reason to head back to the archives, 
and to the amazing historian of Yugoslavian foreign policy, Rinna Kullaa, who worked overtime 
getting me up to speed. Itty Abraham, Jeff Byrne, Ron Granieri, Guy Laron, Roger Owen, Jason 
Parker, Adolph Reed, and Brad Simpson have offered help as I wrestled with the challenges of 
two sharp, reliable critics and friends, Hisham Aidi and Zachary Lockman. I may still have not 
gotten it right. 
1 President Sukarno at the Opening of the Asian-African Conference, April 18, 1955, Appendix to 
George Kahin, The Asian-African Conference: Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1956), p. 44. 
2 G. H. Jansen, Afro-Asia and Non-Alignment (London: Faber and Faber, 1966), p. 182. 
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third world film studies of the University of Michigan-Dearborn, titled her talk “Bandung at 50: 
Judgment on the World or Shift in Consciousness?” Striking a personal note, Professor Arora 
spoke about how, as a young Indian woman, she had learned of and been inspired by the 
presence of Gold Coast prime minister Kwame Nkrumah at Bandung. There was just one small 
problem, I said, during the discussion, having read Scotland Yard’s confidential records on 
Nkrumah at the British National Archives in Kew the year before. Nkrumah was never there.  
It turns out that Bandung is the imagined birthplace of not one but two global “solidarities” 
that some professors continue to confuse with (for lack of a better term) the historical process, 
and that in many cases they elide into one. The first is routinely referred to as “non-alignment” or 
the non-aligned movement. The second is a bit more unwieldy, an emerging “global racial 
consciousness” or a movement of the “darker nations.”3 This article challenges both these ways 
of thinking about the politics of Bandung and its aftermath. The problem is that these myths are 
no more firmly rooted in reality than the imagined presence of Nkrumah. 
They continue to exist not least because so little scholarship has sought to explore them. No 
historians have published studies based on research in the archives of the actually existing 
international organization, the Non-Aligned Movement (or NAM), founded in Belgrade in 1961 at 
the First Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, not at Bandung 
in 1955. It is headquartered in New York with a rotating chairmanship currently held by the 
president of Egypt, Husni Mubarak.4 The major scholarship on NAM is now a few decades old, 
produced mostly by journalists and political scientists specializing in international relations, and 
still worth reading—not least for the routine warnings to avoid what political scientist Peter Willetts 
called the “distortions of history” that solidarities produce.  
                                                      
3 Vijay Prashad, The Darker Nations: A People’s History of the Third World (New York: New 
Press, 2007). 
4 I base this claim on my participation in the Columbia University-organized Conference Group on 
the Non-Aligned Mediterranean and in exchanges with the Princeton workshop group-in-
formation whose co-convenors are Christopher Parker and Bradley Simpson. See as well Rinna 
Kullaa, Non-Alignment and its Origins in Cold War Europe: Yugoslavia, Finland and the Soviet 
Challenge (London: IB Taurus, 2011) forthcoming. 
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He was referring to speeches by the Nigerian and Sri Lankan ambassadors at a 1976 
Howard University conference marking the twenty-fifth anniversary of NAM. Both diplomats 
recalled that the road to Belgrade had passed through Bandung. The Cuban and Yugoslavian 
ambassadors, from key states in NAM’s founding that were neither Asian nor African, disagreed, 
on grounds beyond those of identity or their own leaderships’ legitimization strategies. As Willetts 
put it, and this is a key point, “Bandung in its composition and its decisions was the antithesis of 
non-alignment.”5 Willetts was updating an already existing, well documented and argued 
interpretation, one which political scientist Itty Abraham sustains in his 2009 account of Indian 
foreign policy change.6 Through the mid 1960s the rival Asian-African and Non-Aligned 
frameworks reflected ongoing divisions and competing hegemonic ambitions of, to take just one 
example I explore in this article, Nasser in Egypt and Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana. The Bandung-
to-Belgrade story that many tell now is best understood as part of that multi-front war of position 
as states and their organic intellectuals began to recast events to fit the line of the day. 
Willetts could have said much more about “distortions” at a conference where Howard 
University political scientist James Garrett called on African-Americans to join the other non-
aligned “nations” at the upcoming sixth summit in Havana in 1979.7 According to Garrett, Malcolm 
X had clarified, even if in somewhat narrow terms, why it was important to do so in the landmark 
                                                      
5 Peter Willetts, review of The Third World Without Superpowers: The Collected Documents of 
the Non-Aligned Movement, Odette Jankowitsch and Karl Sauvant, eds., 4 volumes (1979), and 
The Non-Aligned Movement in World Politics, A. W. Singham, ed. (1978), in International Affairs 
55, 3 (1979), pp. 439-441. He develops the point at much greater length and to devastating 
effect, at least if one believes in the value of rationally persuasive argument over folk tales, in his 
own The Non-Aligned Movement: The Origins of a Third World Alliance (London: Pinter, 1978).  
6 Itty Abraham, From Bandung to NAM: Non-Alignment and Indian Foreign Policy, 1947-65, 
Commonwealth and Comparative Studies, 46, 2 (2009), pp. 195-219.  
7 See James Garrett, “Afro-Americans and American Foreign Policy,” in Singham, ed. Non-
Aligned Movement, pp. 217-221. Garrett appears not to understand how the summits were 
organized else is confusing them with solidarity organization meetings where indeed one might 
send a delegation. The meetings of Heads of States had categories of observers and guests but 
these also were states, regional organizations of states such as the Arab League, the Islamic 
League, the OUA, and would be states in the form of liberation organizations, the PLO, SWAPO, 
and so forth.  
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1963 speech at the Northern Negro Grassroots Leadership Conference.8 Malcolm X reads it in 
terms of the binary through which Americans saw the world and that continues to shape the 
histories being produced today.  It was the “first unity meeting in centuries of black people” who 
had transcended their differences primarily through their recognition of the white man as the 
number one enemy.9 Going to Havana might not have seemed so strange a proposal to a 
Howard audience in 1976 either had two stalwart internationalists, W.E.B. Du Bois and Paul 
Robeson, found a way around the state department travel ban twenty years before, since, Garrett 
believed that both had been “invited to participate in the Bandung Conference.”10 My colleague at 
the University of Pennsylvania, Adolph Reed, Jr, who was then teaching political science at 
Howard, responded by condemning the turn to “Black Third Worldism.” It is an essay that ought to 
be on the reading lists now.11    
The historical scholarship that began to appear on these same matters ten years after 
Howard’s anniversary volume on the Belgrade summit and thirty years after the Asian-African 
conference has sought to write African American internationalism “into” and thus revise Cold War 
                                                      
8 The politics surrounding the competing leadership conferences that same weekend in Detroit is 
well known to historians of the civil rights movements and its radical critics. For one recent 
account see Peniel E. Joseph, Waiting ‘Til the Midnight Hour: A Narrative History of Black Power 
in America (New York: Macmillan, 2007), pp. 87-92. We might consider the lessons for writing 
better histories of the diverse tendencies and conflicts underpinning the states meeting at 
Bandung and elsewhere in the 1950s and 1960s (and beyond). 
9 The federally funded partnership with Ashland University’s Ashbrook Center, 
TeachingAmericanHistory.org, gets the title “Message to [the] Grassroots,” and date, November 
10, 1963, not October 10, 1963, wrong on its website for teachers! At least the text is reliable. 
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/index.asp?document=1145, accessed Feb. 4, 2010.  
10 Columbo powers issued invitations only to states and their representatives. Nonetheless the 
strange and false claim about Du Bois’s invitation is kept alive in Gerald Horne and Mary Young, 
eds., W.E.B. Du Bois: An Encyclopedia, entry titled “Bandung Conference,” by  Kenneth Mostern 
(Greenwood Publishing, 2001), pp. 23-24. 
11 Demonstrating a clearer understanding than the Third Worldists of what NAM was about in the 
1970s and how the answers Third Worldism supplied grew more esoteric “as actual opposition 
motion… atrophied,” Reed presses them: “What foreign trade and investment arrangements are 
critical matters within the US Black community? What are our products which cause Afro-
American political passion to rise over worsening terms of trade for goods from the undeveloped 
countries?” Not least, where was “the Afro-American state,” “provisional government or any 
institution which can claim or force a national unity”? Adolph Reed, Jr., “The Current Status of the 
Black Movement,” in Singham, ed., Non-Aligned Movement, pp. 212-216, quotes on 212 and 
215. The essay as submitted was titled “The Erective Flea Doing a Backstroke Beneath a 
Drawbridge, Shouting ‘Raise the Bridge!’: Non-Alignment as an Issue in Black American Politics.” 
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historiography. Not least, they remind us of the continuities in racial identification among leaders 
in Washington and London who had still not quite got the hang of substituting North Atlantic 
community for Anglo Saxon people. While successful, convincing, and innovative in many 
respects, when it comes to Bandung the new “international” or “transnational” social and cultural 
historians have done little more than report what White and Black Americans, reporters, and 
fellow travelers, mostly on the sidelines of these events, imagined and wrote about the darker 
nations, and so they missed a tremendous opportunity to advance our knowledge about Bandung 
and its rivals.12 These projects were unfolding not just as part of the global Cold War but also of a 
complex, post independence politics across three continents or what one of the remarkable 
tacticians of that moment, George Padmore, called the transfer of power.13  
The idea that the First Asian-African Conference in Bandung in 1955 in which the majority of 
29 states were outspokenly aligned—the number of “neutralists” varies from 3 to 10 according to 
how one counts fellow travelers and communists—was a conference of the nonaligned states or 
that the nonaligned movement began there is a kind of Paul Revere’s ride of our postcolonial age. 
Many if not most of the men representing those same dependent states would likely have 
responded to claims of a unity or alliance of color with blank or uncomprehending stares or else 
would have smiled politely and moved on. Getting at race--or better racialization—at Bandung 
requires analysis of the discourse of and identification in terms of “civilizations” different from 
those of the West, as the speeches and resolutions repeatedly asserted, which Itty Abraham and 
                                                      
12 For all the professed differences with “traditional” political and diplomatic histories of the Cold 
War, the new “international” social and cultural history often fails in precisely the same way to get 
beyond the single dimension treatments of actors and institutions elsewhere, in Cairo, say. 
Starkly inferior to accounts of the American “side” and drawn so faithfully from the same side’s 
characterizations of one or another “radical,” “nationalist,” “moderate” (or as a cultural historian 
might write, “client,” “independent,” and the older “comprador), defined in terms of that agent’s or 
institution’s support for or dissent from the preferences of Washington (or Newark, NJ). If 
anything, the accounts of Nasser, Nehru, and others at Bandung are even less convincing than 
those by the diplomatic historians, even while the journalists, musicians, and novelists are made 
to come alive. 
13There is no way around the fact that political scientists and areas studies have produced 
voluminous work on these matters, which go mostly unreferenced. Instead the domains or arenas 
of state building, including, for lack of a better term, the imperial ambitions of one or another 
would be regional hegemon, remain terra incognita, and analyses typically operate, mostly 
unconvincingly, at the level of western neoimperialism and the forces either resisting or assisting 
the new and unequal global order.  
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Kyle Haddad-Fonda have explored most recently.14 What I do here is try to get the politics (not 
least the line-ups) right. 
I first sample the range of recent solidarity journalism, diplomat’s self-fashioning, and claims 
by diplomatic and postcolonial historians and theorists about Bandung, literally all of which are 
grounded not in scholarship but in popular memory. A technical literature exists but its arguments 
have never been confronted and wrestled with. One defensible thesis about why so many 
continue to believe that Bandung gave rise to Belgrade is that most hopelessly confuse the two, 
as we will see, in terms of who were there and what was argued. Any effort to finally write a 
plausible, scholarly version of the Bandung origins of Non-Alignment will need to start with the 
counterfactual: If no Bandung then no Belgrade? (section I) The turn to writing about those for 
whom Bandung represented the hope (or threat) of color’s emergence as a “global identity”15 only 
adds additional layers of confusion about the identifications, affiliations, and choices of those in 
the committees and plenary sessions (II and III). I next consider some key dimensions of the 
politics (and ideas) of Bandung versus Belgrade and Pan-African versus Afro-Asian solidarity 
organizing as part of the process of state building and intervention. Presuming on good grounds 
that those who write about the Non-Aligned Movement today don’t actually know how the 
movement’s members “joined” (they didn’t, they were chosen, much like some readers used to 
choose sides in pickup baseball games, only a lot more states than players, especially African 
ones, were left to go find something else to do), I turn briefly to Nasser’s efforts to dominate this 
institution, Nehru’s efforts to stop him, and the beginning of the latter’s withdrawal from a 
movement that was cresting before it ever had a chance to gather (IV). I then turn to Nasser’s 
rivalry with Nkrumah for domination over the newly independent countries of Africa, and the 
assistance the latter obtained from the Asian state that the Middle Eastern ones kept out of 
                                                      
14 Abraham, From Bandung to NAM, and Kyle Haddad-Fonda, “The Anti-Imperialist Tradition and 
the Development of Sino-Arab Relations, 1955-1958, senior thesis, Departments of History and 
Near Eastern Languages and Civilizations, Harvard, 2009. This remarkable work draws on work 
in both Chinese and Arabic sources. 
15 Cynthia Young discussing Du Bois’s reading of Bandung and by extension the “ideals 
animating a diverse group of US-based intellectuals, artists, and activists mobilizing in the 1960s 
and 1970s.” Soul Power: Culture, Radicalism, and the Making of a US Third World Left (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2006), p. 2. 
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Bandung, that is, Israel (V). I conclude with some implications of the turn from solidarity to 
scholarship (VI). 
 




(d) None of the Above 
Political scientist George McTurnan Kahin (1918-2000) is best known as an early critic of the 
Vietnam War who as a new assistant professor served as executive director of Cornell’s 
Southeast Asia program and founded its Modern Indonesia Project in 1954. He happened to be 
Indonesia on a research leave when the five Colombo Powers—Indonesia, India, Burma, Ceylon, 
and Pakistan—hosted the Asian-African Conference in Bandung in April 1955.16 Indonesia’s 
Sukarno, a gifted public speaker, opened the meeting with a speech that included the lines 
quoted above from Henry Wadsworth Longfellow’s Midnight Ride of Paul Revere, a surprising 
oratorical turn that American diplomats said they had inspired.17 Kahin is one of the never 
mentioned two dozen or so American men and women who wandered the halls and hotels that 
week along side Richard Wright, Carl Rowan, Max Yergan, and Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., and 
Kahin knew a lot more than most about Asia.18  
                                                      
16 See Kahin’s obituary in Cornell News, 
http://www.news.cornell.edu/releases/Feb00/G.McT.Kahin.Obit.html, accessed November 27, 
2008. Kahin was arrested and expelled from the country by the Dutch colonial authorities while he 
was pursuing his Ph.D. research in 1948-1949, which he published as Nationalism and 
Revolution in Indonesia (Cornell 1951). According to his student and friend Dan Lev, the US 
government also blocked his passport for a while around this time. 
17 “This touch came from a hint which I dropped to  Abdulgcsi [presumably an error in decoding 
referring to Roeslan Abdulghani] several weeks ago. Secretary General greeted me this morning 
at opening session with enthusiastic remark to effect that “It’s included.”” Jakarta to State, 1869, 
April 18, 1955, General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59, 670.901/4-1555, 
US National Archives, College Park, MD [hereafter cited as RG 59 with filing information]. 
18 China scholar Arthur Doak Barnett, then based in Hong Kong, was another knowledgeable 
observer at the conference, and he wrote four detailed dispatches for the American Universities 
Field Staff, although these have not been referenced before to my knowledge. The State 
Department’s Office of Intelligence Research compiled and circulated all four in summer. See 
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Kahin decided to write a book on the conference, as did Richard Wright. Unlike the latter, 
Kahin traveled to Cairo, Delhi, Karachi, and Rangoon to follow up with key delegates, including 
Nehru’s main advisor, Krishna Menon, and a thirty-seven year old Egyptian colonel, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser, the new prime minister who made his debut on the international stage at Bandung, his 
second trip abroad in his life following his pilgrimage to Saudi Arabia a year earlier. Back in Ithaca 
a few months later with a bundle of press clippings and other source materials, Kahin produced 
the first and still essential scholarly work on Bandung.19 Asian-African Conference. Bandung, 
Indonesia, April 1955 appeared a month or two behind pamphlets by a conference administrator 
and head of the Indian Institute for World Affairs, Angadipuram Appadorai, and by an Evanston, 
Illinois Unitarian minister, peace activist, and American Committee on Africa board member, 
Homer Jack, who attended on journalist credentials, and about the same time as Wright’s Color 
Curtain. A few months later, the conference’s crusading Filipino anticommunist, Carlos Romulo, 
came out with The Meaning of Bandung.20 It would take another 50 years before another book on 
Bandung itself appeared. 
Kahin’s conclusions hold up well against what has since been revealed in declassified 
records from the 1950s. Nehru in particular was reluctant to hold such a meeting. What led the 
five leaders of Asia to agree to go ahead ultimately was the fear that increasing US-China 
tensions might lead to a new major war in the region, which inspired the decision to invite the 
People’s Republic, a state that the US had prevented from taking its seat at the UN.21 Kahin 
                                                      
Report on Bandung by A. Doak Barnett, External Research Paper Number 124, August 31, 1955, 
Folder 637, Box 84, Series-Washington, DC, Record Group 4, Nelson A Rockefeller Papers (NAR 
Papers), Rockefeller Family Archives, Rockefeller Archive Center, Tarrytown, New York 
[hereafter RAC with filing information]/ 
19 His wife, Audrey, allowed me to use Kahin’s research collection on Bandung in 2006 while she 
was still working through his career’s worth of papers.  
20 See Appadorai, Titles, Homer Jack, Bandung: An On-The-Spot Description of the Asian-African 
Conference (Chicago: Toward Freedom, 1956), Carlos Romulo, The Meaning of Bandung 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1956), and Richard Wright…  
21The new literature on these matters in this period is enormous but start with Thomas 
Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American 
Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996), Chen Jian, Mao’s China and 
the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), and Gong Li, “Tension 
across the Taiwan Strait in the 1950s: Chinese Strategy and Tactics,” in Robert Ross and Jiang 
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judged the event a success, “modest, it is true, but more than most statesmen had expected.” On 
the one hand, Zhou Enlai’s performance had allayed the suspicions of many delegates, who were 
meeting for the first time with the communist leader from a country tied to the USSR by treaty. On 
the other hand, a kind of “moral restraint against Chinese aggression” had emerged (they hoped). 
Other accounts, including Richard Wright’s and Doak Barnett’s, back Kahin up on the masterful 
diplomacy of the Chinese premier who used the conference to call for a negotiated solution to the 
Formosa crisis. In other words, Bandung played a “significant…if relatively minor” role in the first, 
brief post-Stalin “détente between the Communist and non-Communist worlds,” as Kahin 
envisioned it.22  
Since not all delegations were necessarily aware of let alone compelled by the motives of 
the organizers, there is a second (in Kahin’s view secondary) way in which to gauge the success 
of the conference, namely in terms of “areas of agreement” among the conferees.23 What united 
the 29 delegations, as opposed to the 5 organizers only, judging from the final resolutions, was 
an opposition to colonialism and white supremacy or what was referred to as “racialism.” 
Throughout that week, delegates had condemned apartheid in South Africa on these grounds.24 
Delegates also agreed that those of them still excluded from the UN—Cambodia, Ceylon, Japan, 
Jordan, Libya, Nepal and a “unified Vietnam”—were entitled to membership, and that while they 
affirmed the legitimacy of the UN they wanted a greater voice in the Security Council. They 
collectively endorsed the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pressed for general 
disarmament, and called for greater economic cooperation and cultural exchanges among their 
countries and regions.  
                                                      
Changbin, eds, Re-examining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973 (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Asia Center, 2001). 
22 Kahin, Asian-African Conference, pp. 1-2, 4-5. 
23 Ibid., p. 32. 
24 See the account by Homer Jack for the significance of the conference from an African as 
opposed to an Asian perspective, which doesn’t bother to reference the questions of defense 
pacts and peaceful coexistence, but does reference the paternalism of Nehru in a conference 
where “Africa was very much a junior partner.” Thus, it was “up to Asia to help Africa to the best 
of her ability.” Homer Jack, “Africa at Bandung, Africa Today, 2, 2 (May-June 1955), pp. 12-13. 
He rehearses the point in his 1956 Bandung while noting how ideas of a rising anti-white racism 
there failed to conform to reality, pp, 32-33, 36. 
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We might add that they also reaffirmed the right, specified in Articles 51 of the UN Charter, 
of a state to defend itself, “singly or collectively.” The original draft articles of the United Nations 
had said nothing about “collective self defense,” but South American delegates at the founding 
San Francisco conference proposed the new article to resolve the crisis over the status of the 
Inter-American System, an alliance-in-formation with the United States. Some at the time had 
thought regional defense arrangements would contravene the “universality of the jurisdiction” of 
the proposed UN Security Council. Egypt’s representative argued for the legitimacy of the new 
six-member Arab League under the same Article 51 while adding that Egypt was against the 
kinds of alliance agreements that had been forced on his own country by Great Britain.25 The 
Atlantic Pact or Treaty signed in 1949 would soon follow, and Nehru argued in closed session at 
Bandung that there had been good grounds for founding NATO but that he objected to the 
extension of such arrangements to colonial territories.26 Nehru would also do much backtracking 
in later years in trying to square what was agreed to at Bandung with his opposition to regional 
defense pacts. The ambiguities reflected the unanimity rule adopted for the conference and the 
more enduring one (or reality) that small states feared near-by state building projects more than 
far away Cold War politics. 
Reviewing Kahin book in the Institute of Pacific Relation’s journal, Pacific Affairs, together 
with what he called the slighter contribution by Appadorai (that the IPR published), the Dutch 
anthropologist W F Wertheim opened with the prediction that the recently concluded conference 
would appear in future history textbooks as “one of the major events” of the mid-twentieth 
century, although Westerners were slow to recognize its importance.27 Howard University’s Merze 
Tate led with the same claim in reviewing Wright’s Color Curtain while tearing it apart for its 
                                                      
25 Joseph Kunz, “Individual and Collective Self-Defense in Article 51 of the Charter of the United 
Nations,” American Journal of International Law, 41, 4 (October 1947), pp. 872-879. 
26 Kahin, Asian-African Conference, p. 30. 
27 Untitled Review, Pacific Affairs, 29, 3 (September 1956), pp. 272-273. W. F. (“Pak”) Wertheim, 
who died in 1999, is described in one tribute of Holland’s counterpart to George McT Kahin, a 
second supporter of the nationalist struggle, and the founder of Indonesian studies in Holland. 
See the Obituary by Herb Feith, http://insideindonesia.org/content/view/710/29/, accessed 
November 27, 2008. 
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exaggerated color consciousness.28 Wertheim and Tate though got it wrong. For decades, 
historians have mostly ignored the Asian-African Conference, else we wouldn’t find scholars 
echoing the solidarity movements’ origin stories quite so faithfully.29 Kahin’s study sits 
undisturbed in the stacks and off site storage facilities, and can be bought for next to nothing on 
line, while Wright’s was reprinted in 1994, giving new life to the romance of Bandung as a 
gathering of all the darker and nonaligned nations and peoples that has come to substitute for 
knowledge of the event and the complex political conflicts and alignments that it reflected.  
The mythmaking was a phenomenon first noted and brilliantly dissected decades ago by G. 
H. Jansen in the still unsurpassed 1966 postmortem on the two distinct and ultimately competing 
frameworks of Afro-Asia and of Nonalignment.30 Most of what continues to be written about the 
conference by public intellectuals, would be revivers of the “Spirit of Bandung” and professors of 
postcolonial studies is myth, like what was written about Paul Revere, drawing on Longfellow’s 
romance as a source. In both cases, “facts matter little when a good story is at stake.”31  
In an hour’s search I came up with a dozen recent examples. In 1994, then New York Times 
foreign correspondent Barbara Crossette remembers the “summit” wistfully, using the wrong 
name, “the Afro-Asian Conference.” Nehru had made a specific decision to call it the Asian-
African Conference because, as he explained at a press conference in December 1954 in 
Jakarta, “it is a finer way of describing it. We put Asia first because it is a smaller word, not 
because Asia is more important or less.” In private he objected that Afro-Asian “sounded like 
                                                      
28 Merze Tate, Journal of Negro History, 41, 3 (July 1956), 263-265. Tate had recently returned 
from a year in Asia on a Fulbright Grant where she had lectured across India, traveled, and 
continued research on the imperial expansion in the Pacific. 
29 As Antoinette Burton, Augusto Spiritu, and Fanon Che Wilkins write in an introductory piece, 
“The Fate of Nationalisms in the Age of Bandung,” when they submitted a panel proposal on 
Bandung to the 2005 meeting of the American Historical Association, they were told that no one 
on the committee had heard of it. Radical History Review 95 (Spring 2006), pp. 145-148: 145. 
30 Jansen, Afro-Asia. Philip Holden returns to this critique of the mythmaking in his “Imagined 
Individuals: National Autobiography and Postcolonial Self-Fashioning, Asia Research Institute, 
Working Paper Series, No 13, October 2003. 
31 Ray Raphael, Founding Myths: Stories That Hide Our Patriotic Past (New York: New Press, 
2004), p. 23. 
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aphrodisiac.”32 But Crossette also included then Gold Coast prime minister Kwame Nkrumah 
among the summiteers.33  
In 2002, Philippine Foreign Secretary Blas Ople called for a second Bandung Conference to 
follow on the first, the one that brought together, among others, Castro, Tito, and Nkrumah.34 
Ward Churchill singled out Mao Zedung’s contribution to the event the very next year.35 But the 
hazy recollections of what transpired at Bandung picked up steam as post-Third World States 
actually fulfilled Ople’s dream, meeting at a new Nonaligned Summit in Havana in October 2006. 
The one-time editor of Muhammad Speaks, Askia Muhammad, filed a report from Cuba where 
Kofi Annan had evoked Nkrumah as a founding figure of the movement at Bandung. Muhammad 
includes him together with Nehru, Tito, Sukarno, and Nasser, the five stalwarts he imagines is 
who was referred to in what he calls “the Initiative of Five.”36  Chilean journalist Alejandro Kirk, 
filing from Havana for Terraviva, remembers Bandung too as the place in 1955 where Tito, 
Nkrumah, and Ho Chi Minh first got together.37 Egyptian journalist Galal Nasser, in a January 
2007 column recalling the ideals that drove an earlier Egyptian generation, has his hero, Gamal 
Abd al-Nasser leading a campaign that culminates in Bandung, where equally idealistic leaders 
such as Tito, Nkrumah, and Jomo Kenyatta “joined…in a call for liberation and independence that 
turned the Third World into a counterbalance of both East and West.”38 Two months later, in a 
                                                      
32 See Jakarta to State, telegram 1590, March 24, 1955, Record Group 59, State Department 
Central Files, 1955-1959, 670.901/3-2455. 
33 “The ‘Third World’ Is Dead, But Spirits Linger, NYT, November 13, 1994, 
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9905E2DE1731F930A25752C1A962958260, 
accessed November 28, 2008. 
34 Holden, “Imagined Individuals,” p. 1. 
35 Ward Churchill, On the Justice of Roosting Chickens (City? A.K Press, 2003), p. 286. Sadly, so 
did Don Peretz in The Middle East Today (New York: Praeger, 1994), p. 148. 
36 “Non-Aligned Movement Summit Attended by U.S. Foes and Allies [just like at Bandung!], 
FinalCall.com News, October 13, 2006, 
http://www.finalcall.com/artman/publish/article_2983.shtml, accessed November 28, 2008. 
37 “Renovation in NAM: The Winding Road of the Non-Aligned,” Asia Media Forum, Posted 
September 13, 2006, http://www.theasiamediaforum.org/node/522, accessed on November 28, 
2008.  
38 “The Generation Gap,” Ahram Weekly, January 18-24, 2007, 
http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2007/828/op33.htm, accessed November 28, 2008. 
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posting on the world wide web, the deputy editorial page editor at the Jerusalem Post, Eliot 
Yager, misdates the conference to 1956, and says it is where Nkrumah “met and exchanged 
ideas with Third World luminaries” including Ho Chi Minh.39 The London School of Economics 
and fraternal organizations sponsored a conference in Serbia on the fiftieth anniversary of the 
conference, inviting participants to reflect anew on a meeting that had Nkrumah meeting other 
Third World Leaders.40 Most recently, Rob Burton, an English professor at California State 
University-Chico, includes Nkrumah in his list of “high profile delegations,” but calls him the leader 
of Sudan, a country he says “had been recently freed of colonial domination,” although Sudan 
was then still a joint condominium of the Egyptians and the British.41 
Nasser, fearing for his fate at home, was a late-deciding attendee who received his main 
briefing on the upcoming conference from the CIA.42 None of the hosts knew much about him. 
Nehru, who was suspicious of Nasser’s close ties to the Americans and who had read his 
Philosophy of the Revolution (“a pamphlet”) did not think much of his intellect.43 Nasser was, 
needless to say, not one of the conference’s organizers, let alone a neutralist visionary. When 
quizzed by journalists in New Delhi about his views on Nehru’s five famous principles of 
                                                      
39 The ironically titled post is “Taking Ghana For Granted,” The Jager File, 
http://elliotjager.com/2007/03/taking-ghana-for-granted.html, accessed November 28, 2008. 
40 http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/IDEAS/2005%20CWSC%20Events.htm, accessed December 
15, 2008. 
41 See Rob Burton, “The Enduring Legacies of Bandung, Non-Alignment, and Richard Wright,” 
2nd Global Conference: Multiculturalism, Conflict, and Belonging, September 2008, Mansfield 
College, Oxford. He also describes Nasser of Egypt as among the attendees on the CIA’s “most 
wanted list” at a time when the CIA had closer ties to Nasser than to any other Arab leader, and 
was closer to him than the ambassador, as the quotation below hints at. See Robert Vitalis, When 
Capitalists Collide: Business Conflict and the End of Empire in Egypt (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1995). 
42 So the US ambassador reported back to Washington after seeing Nasser on the eve of his Asia 
tour, “extremely thorough coverage and briefing by another agency reaching him personally made 
it unnecessary that I do other than support what had been given hm.” Cairo to State, 1483, April 
5, 1955, RG 59, 670.901/4-555. 
43 Ginat, Neutralism, p. 94, drawing on correspondence between Nehru and the Indian 
ambassador in Cairo. 
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coexistence, he responded, “what are they?”44 Nehru, who was a neutralist, had, as I said, initially 
objected to the holding of the meeting. None of the other men named above had set foot in 
Bandung that April.  Nkrumah, leader of the Gold Coast, not Sudan, and anxious not to do 
anything to upset the timetable for independence, sent his friend Kojo Botsio as “observer” rather 
than as a full-fledged delegate, with instructions to keep his head down.45 Kenyatta wasn’t invited. 
Nor was Tito. Ho’s close comrade and prime minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, 
Pham Van Dong, led the North’s delegation. And last time I looked Cuba wasn’t an Asian-African 
state nor was it one governed by Castro, the guerilla, interned at the Isle of Pines Prison at the 
time of the Bandung meeting.  
A reader might object that I have stacked the deck with writers, journalists, and literature 
professors, yet even historians get this one wrong or, better, don’t even question what has 
become a matter of common sense. Partha Chaterjee’s recent effort to revisit the idea of empire 
imagines a Bandung conference where Nkrumah and Ho took part.46 The prolific Australian Asian 
studies scholar, Mark T Berger, wrote the entry on Bandung for the Encyclopedia of the 
Developing World, which also includes Nkrumah and Tito among the attendees.47 The University 
of Colorado professor of modern Egyptian history, James Jankowski, and the Clark University 
historian of the cold war in the Middle East, Doug Little both write that Nasser was with Tito in 
                                                      
44 “A Place in the Sun,” Time, Monday, April 25, 1955, available on line at 
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,861356-2,00.html, accessed December 15, 
2008. 
45 Commonwealth Relations Office to Various High Commissioners, No. 89, March 28, 1955, DO 
35/4665, The National Archives of Great Britain, Kew [hereafter cited as TNA with filing 
information]; Memorandum of Conversation, Report on Bandung by Adam Clayton Powell, Jr., 
May 9, 1955, RG 59, 670.901/5-955.  
46 Partha Chatterjee, “Empire and Nation Revisited: 50 Years After Bandung,” Inter-Asia Cultural 
Studies, 6, 4 (2005): 487-496. The power of the myth’s hold over us is only made more clear 
when we consider that Chatterjee used and quoted from documents written at the time. Consider 
as well Brantly Womack, the professor of politics and specialist in Asian international relations 
who named China one of the five sponsoring countries (!) of Bandung in China and Vietnam 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 169. Conservative historian Arthur Herman 
places Nkumah at Bandung in Idea of Decline in Western History (New York: Free Press, 1997), 
p. 218 
47 “Bandung Conference (1955),” in Thomas M. Leonard, ed., Encyclopedia of the Developing 
World, Volume 1, A-E  (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 139-140. 
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Bandung.48 And Robert J. C. Young, in the weighty Postocolonialism: An Introduction (2001), 
includes—well you can guess by now—Nkumah and “odd-man-out geographically, though not 
geopolitically, Tito.”49 Compounding the nicely executed standard error with a wholly original one, 
Young says that the conferees “set up the institutional basis of what would become the 
Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, and while an institution means different things to different 
people, Nehru and others acted to prevent the creation of any kind of permanent structure or 
organization, and various would be conveners of a follow up meeting—Nasser, Sukarno, 
Pakistan’s Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Algeria’s Ben Bella—failed repeatedly over the next ten years to 
bring Asian and African states together once more, the Egyptians perhaps going so far as to 
bomb a conference site in Algiers to prevent organizers from meeting.50  
Little wonder that those who hold up the banner of Bandung today prefer to imagine that the 
sometime rival, sometime simply orthogonal convocations track the evolution of a “movement”: 
The meeting of Afro-Asian, including Russian, peoples, not states, at Cairo in 1957, which led to 
the creation of the Afro Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization with backing by the Soviets, the 
meeting of Independent African States in 1958, and of Pan-Africanists in Accra in 1959, of Non-
Aligned Heads of States or Governments in 1961, the one that is routinely confused with 
Bandung in most of the above examples. Future scholars might want to do more to recognize, 
distance themselves from, and test the assumptions of the solidarity groups (and no doubt Indian 
                                                      
48 James Jankowski, Nasser’s Egypt, Arab Nationalism and the United Arab Republic (Boulder: 
Lynne Reinner, 2001), p. 65. Douglas Little, American Orientalism (New York: X), p. 168. In 
addition we can add the self-styled Middle East expert, Trevor Mostyn, reviewing a biography of 
Nasser in the Times Literary Supplement, January 28, 2005, available on line at 
http://www.trevormostyn.com/page17.htm, accessed December 15, 2008. 
49 He goes on to explain the logic motivating Tito to attend (p. 191). More amazing still, he does 
so while citing all the 1955 and 1956 books on the conference! 
50 Nehru had made clear in a press conference before the meeting that he “did not foresee 
establishment any permanent body,” as the Djakarta embassy reported back to State, 1833, April 
17, USRG 59, 670.901/14.1755, Box 2669, USNA. As Jamie Mackie writes, pointedly, “no 
organizational arrangements or mechanisms had been set up (Nehru regarded this as 
superfluous), and no action was taken to do so.” Bandung 1955: Non-Alignment and Afro-Asian 
Solidarity (Singapore: Didier Millet, 2005), pp. 109-100, and passim. Also See Colin Legum, 
Bandung, Cairo, And Accra: Report on the First Conference of Independent African States 
(London: Africa Bereau, 1958); Franklin Weinstein, “The Second Asian-African Conference: 
Preliminary Bouts,” Asian Survey, 5, 7 (July 1965), pp. 359-373, and Guy Pauker, “The Rise and 
Fall of Afro-Asian Solidarity,” Asian Survey 5, 9 (September 1965), pp. 425-432. 
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and Egyptian school books), by answering the following questions: If Bandung is understood 
most fundamentally as a launching point for the Nonaligned Movement, then why, once launched, 
did the original conveners of Bandung continue efforts to reassemble? Minimally, it means that 
the concerns of the two groupings or leaderships did not completely overlap, another point 
carefully, clearly, and repeatedly made by virtually all scholars at the time. What has happened in 
the meantime?51  
 
II Color Curtain 
One, the most recent problem, is that the new social and cultural historians chose to leave 
the political science of the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s behind (or never thought to look for it) while 
turning to the Chicago Defender, Pittsburgh Courier, Baltimore Afro-American and the Color 
Curtain to revive the accounts invariably found there of Bandung as a meeting of the darker 
races. Knowing what the reporters wrote and what inspired African American internationalism in a 
dismal time in the US is important but that work at times confuses the world views of North 
Americans with, well, views of the world as a whole. And they can get carried away. So, Paul 
Gorden Lauren believes, much like Malcolm X did, that the organizers “deliberately refused to 
invite any white power,” which is not true, as Wright himself documents (p. 88). He also describes 
Nehru and Nasser, among others, speaking “movingly about their shared experience due to the 
black, brown, and yellow color of their skins.”52  
Nehru declined the opportunity to address the conference in open session but in his 
summing up on the last day not a word about race appears. Nasser gave three addresses. None 
of them uses the word race or color let alone speaks of race’s effect on him or on Egyptians or on 
Middle Eastern peoples. There is virtually nothing in any of the addresses at Bandung, including 
those by Yilma Deressa of Ethiopia, in Botsio’s short remarks, or by Ismail al-Azhahri of Sudan 
                                                      
51 Peter Lyon, writing in 1963 was another who got it right. Neutralism existed as one politically 
tendency before and during the conference but was in no way “fully synonymous” with the states 
that met and the projects they pursued at Bandung. See his Neutralism (Leicster: Leicster 
University Press, 1963), p 48. 
52 Paul Gordon Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial 
Discrimination, Second Edition (Boulder: Westview, 1996), pp. 223-224. 
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that remotely resembles Lauren’s account about what went on in the conference hall.53 The one 
serious exception is the long address by Romulo, who indeed spoke passionately about the effect 
of race on him, other Filipinos and other victims of colonialism, and just as important, warned of 
new forms of racialism threatening to erupt in many of the newly independent countries. 
It is as if the new historians never read beyond the line in the official transcript where 
Sukarno welcomes “the first intercontinental conference of colored peoples in the history of 
mankind,” a statement that led to objections by many of the delegates. Nasser, Faisal ibn Abd al-
Aziz, and the other Arabs hardly identified as such. Nonetheless, Melani Mcalister in Epic 
Encounters holds up Nasser in particular at Bandung both for leading the misidentified twenty-
nine state nonaligned movement but also for representing (for whom other than those in Harlem?) 
a new “global racial consciousness.”54 The Lebanese ally of the US, Charles Malik, in a debriefing 
with Dulles, expressed his real fears that the colored races could very well be coming together in 
a way that threatened the West’s interests, of which he and his people were a part.55 The Turkish 
delegates complained about the repeated references by the North Americans there to Bandung 
as a meeting of colored races since it by (self) definition left Turkey out.56 Finally, consider the 
book published by the Institute of Asian-African Relations on the first anniversary of the Bandung 
Conference, which explains that India, Iran, and the rest of the Middle East are peopled by 
                                                      
53 Azhari would later write that one important consequence of the conference “is that those 
colored races which had long been living at the borderline turn today into a great force whose say 
comes out like thunder, and they have proved their ability to direct this formidable force towards 
good and right and not towards evil and aggression.” “Sudanese Delegates’ Impressions and 
Views on Bandung Conference,” Sudan Weekly News, Special Supplement, Sudan in Bandung 
Conference, Khartoum, n.d. but probably Summer 1955, p. 32. The accounts by three other 
delegates, Mubarak Zaroug, (Minister of Communications), Hassan Awadalla (Minister of 
Agriculture), and Khalifa Abbas (Deputy Under Secretary of External Affairs) also do not invoke 
any notion of particular race consciousness or identity. 
54 See p. 90. She goes on to misidentify the 1957 Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference as the “follow-
up event to Bandung,” and claims it is where, as host, Nasser replaced Nehru as leader of the 
movement (p. 91). Nasser never stepped foot inside the meeting at any point that week. Legum 
called it a mystery. The US embassy read it as a function of the too visible role of the communists 
there, by whom they generally meant the fellow traveler, Khaled Mohieddin, who headed it. 
55 See Memorandum of Conversation, May 5, 1955, Report on Bandung, RG 59, 670.901/5-555. 
56 Observation made in the report produced by an agent of the Standard Vacuum Oil Company 
assigned to cover Bandung, author omitted in the copy given to the State Department and dated 
May 10, 1955, enclosed in Tucker to Hodge, August 15, 1955, STANVAC Special report on 
Bandung Afro-Asian Conference, RG 59, 670.901/8-1555. 
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“branches of the White Man,” just different from the branch that subjugated the Black and Yellow 
Man.57 
Brenda Plummer explains the origins of Bandung as the response of “a group of African, 
Middle Eastern, and Asian neutralists” to bullying by the US and USSR, calling for a “May 1955 
conference of nonaligned states.” I count three errors of fact in that one sentence alone. The 
result was, she says, a rejection of Cold War Era treaty making.”58  That is the fourth. Penny Von 
Eschen relies in turn on Lauren in her account of the conference as the “most important and 
influential of several attempts” to organize around nonalignment, and she adopts the reading of 
the run up to the event then popular in Harlem, Washington, London and Canberra, but far 
removed from accounts in Cairo, Beijing, Colombo or Delhi.59 Meanwhile, Kevin Gaines relies on 
Plummer, writing that Bandung launched nonalignment “as a global political formation.”60 
Let me be clear that I love each of the books just referenced. The point is to solve the 
problem that these errors appear to pose, driven generally by the project itself of emphasizing 
and at times adopting the particular perspective of what comes to be called African-American or 
Black internationalism. Justin Hart is another scholar who emphasizes the same particularistic 
point of view of much of this literature. 61 There are also some other key works by diplomatic 
historians that advance arguments, syntheses and revisions that have little in common with the 
Bandung-as-birth-of the-non-aligned-movement school, while the evidence they uncover offers 
scant support to the idea. University of Auckland professor Nicholas Tarling led the way in 1992 
with an illuminating account of British policy, and three new US-focused studies followed by Cary 
                                                      
57 Suniti Kumar Chatterji, “Black Africa and the World,” Peaceful Coexistence, Institute of Asian-
African Relations, Calcutta, 1956. 
58 Brenda Plummer, Rising Wind: Black Americans and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 1935-1960 (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), p. 247.  
59 Penny Von Eschen, Race Against Empire: Black Americans and Anticolonialism, 1937-1957 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997), pp. 168-169.  
60 Kevin Gaines, American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2006), p. 71. 
61 Justin Hart, “Making Democracy Safe for the World: Race, Propaganda, and the 
Transformation of United States Foreign Policy During World War II, Pacific Historical Review 73, 
1 (Feb 2004), pp. 49-84: 53, n. 4. 
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Fraser in 2003, Matthew Jones in 2005, and Jason Parker in 2006.62 Fraser, Jones, and Parker 
also all locate themselves within the new “race in the making of US foreign policy” current.63 
 
III  “The Atlantic Charter: It Means Dark Races Too” 64 
There are two steps we can take toward a better understanding of the politics of the Asian 
African Conference and its connection to the proliferating set of meetings, conferences, and 
summits that grew in parallel with the increase in newly-independent countries, most in Africa, 
after 1960. The first step is the easy one, and that is to recognize that the versions found in the 
books referenced above are all mirror images of the ones conjured up by the US State 
Department and British Foreign Office. The darker races had gathered at Bandung under the 
                                                      
62 Nicolas Tarling, “‘Ah-Ah’: Britain and the Bandung Conference of 1955,” Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies 23, 1 (March 1992): 74-111; Cary Fraser, “An American Dilemma: Race and 
Realpolitik in the American Response to the Bandung Conference, 1955,” in Brenda Plummer, 
ed., Window On Freedom: Race, Civil Rights, and Foreign Affairs, 1945-1988 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2003), pp. 115-140; Matthew Jones, “A “Segregated” Asia?: 
Race, the Bandung Conference and Pan-Asianist Fears in American Thought and Policy, 1954-
1955,” Diplomatic History, 29, 5 (November 2005), pp. 841-868; and Jason Parker, “Cold War II: 
The Eisenhower Administration, the Bandung Conference, and the Reperiodization of the 
Postwar Era,” Diplomatic History, 30, 5 (November 2006), pp. 1-26. 
63 Again, though, they are better and richer on the American and British sides, from imperious 
secretaries of state to crusading Harlem congressmen, than they are on the states and their 
agents who officially participated in the conference. Fraser and Parker have written on the 
Caribbean. Jones does not specialize on any of the states attending the conference. The point is 
not that they need to do so, but that we are missing scholarship that does, and as a result the old 
stories go uncorrected and unrevised. Read any of these side by side with Kahin for a sense of 
what we are still missing in the newest histories, and consider two new and important accounts of 
the participation by the Japanese delegation by Kweku Ampiah, of Chinese policy by Shu Guang 
Zhang, and of Egypt’s bilateral relationship begun at Bandung by Haddad-Fonda as models for 
future work in the unlikely event that the authoritarian countries ever open up their archives. 
Kweku Ampiah, The Political and Moral Imperatives of the Bandung Conference of 1955: The 
Reactions of the US, UK and Japan (Kent: Global Oriental, 2007) and Shu Guang Zhang, 
“Constructing ‘Peaceful Coexistence’: China’s Diplomacy Toward the Geneva Conferences, 
1954-55, Cold War History, 7, 4 (November 2007), pp. 509-528.  Ampu is the exception to my 
rule of new work that is not animated (haunted) by the Bandung spirit. He is, and in stark contrast 
to his careful account of policies, the defense of the idea of a movement’s birth in April 1955 is 
asserted rather than demonstrated using the same methods deployed in the rest of the study.  
64 Headline of the Labor Party’s newspaper following Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee’s 
appearance before the West African Students’ Union following the Allies August 1941 issuance of 
the Atlantic Charter that promised self-determination to all peoples. Quoted in Kenneth Robert 
Janken, Rayford W. Logan and the Dilemma of the African-American Intellectual (Amherst: 
University of Massachusetts Press, 1993), p. 168. 
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umbrella of nonalignment but it is something to be celebrated rather than condemned for the 
positive rather than negative effects, vague as these might be, on world order.  
In the six months or so before the Colombo powers agreed to hold the Asian-African 
conference, and as they negotiated the list of invitees, the functionaries of the Eisenhower 
administration let their fears run wild. They were haunted by what H.W. Brands describes as—but 
never critically dissects nor distances himself from—“the specter of neutralism.”65 They were also 
haunted by the specter of race, but Brands is like many others predictably silent about the coarse 
and dismissive treatments of various leaders and peoples that fill the declassified dispatches, 
telegrams, and memoranda of conversations, which as I said is just one reason to be thankful for 
all the great work on racism and foreign policy that is being done.  
 A few at the conference—Sukarno, Nehru, and Sihanouk—presented variants on Dulles’s 
dreaded doctrine but it was only one of a number of orientations on offer and it would be a year or 
two before Egypt’s leaders declared themselves full followers of positive neutralism and 
nonalignment too—in what Leonard Binder soon called a Bismarkian or Prussian expansionist 
project.66 By then, however, China had reaffirmed its commitment to the unity of the Communist 
bloc and launched a sustained ideological attack on Tito, following with a more deadly kind of war 
with the erstwhile peacefully coexisting India in 1962. Nehru would secure emergency arms from 
the US and its allies, as his comrades in the so-called nonaligned movement opted instead not to 
alienate their own backers China, the USSR or both.67 Matters only grew more treacherous year 
by year for anyone trying to keep various peace or disarmament, nonalignment, and solidarity 
projects going, and the truth is that a few years after the world’s first conference of a peculiar 
                                                      
65 H.W. Brands, The Specter of Neutralism: The United States and the Emergence of the Third 
World, 1947-1960 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989). 
66 For Nasser’s use of the term, see Leonard Binder, “Egypt’s Positive Neutrality,” in Morton A. 
Kaplan, ed., The Revolution in World Politics (New York: John Wiley, 1962), pp. 175-191: 180. 
This remains until now the best discussion in English on Nasser’s evolution as a neutralist. The 
mythmaking soon took off in earnest, with Nasser’s sycophants recalling that Nehru followed 
Nasser’s lead in Bandung, p. 188. 
67 A. M. Halpern, “The Chinese Communist Line on Neutralism,” China Quarterly 5 (Jan-Mar, 
1961), pp. 90-115. 
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subset of nonaligned countries at Belgrade, where the alleged founding Asian-African Conference 
at Bandung was hardly talked about, scholars had turned seriously to the writing of postmortems.   
Both these obsessions have histories that predate Bandung by decades. Dulles and other 
trans-Atlanticists combated neutralism first in the United States during the interwar years before 
taking on one or another imagined “Third Force” rising in Europe in the 1940s and Asia in the 
1950s. Dulles at one point guessed that both Greece and Turkey would succumb.68 The fear of a 
revolt of the colored races, the rising tide of color, and the prospect of race war ran even deeper, 
evoked routinely each decade in Washington and elsewhere since 1905 when a white power was 
defeated by colored one in the Russo-Japanese war.69 The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 
which was London’s equivalent of the Council on Foreign Relations, began its pitch to the 
Rockefeller Foundation for fresh analysis of the threat likely to replace the struggle against 
communism in the not to distant future by beginning with 1905 and ending with the Bandung 
Conference.70 And in his September 29, 1963 New York Times think piece, “Is a Race War 
Shaping Up?” distinguished historian Arnold Toynbee assessed the chances that whites would 
have to confront a world alliance of colored races—they would not, he forecast—in the course of 
China’s bid for world domination no later than the year 2000. 
Nothing speaks to the fantastical nature of the accounts leading up to Bandung more than 
that none of them proved true. No delegate ever argued on the grounds that what united 
otherwise disparate religions, regions, and commitments represented there was something called 
race or color. Color was a fact for some, not for some others, but for no one was it what united 
them. To the contrary, many rejected the idea that color mattered. They called it racialism and 
warned against appealing to it as a dangerous and retrograde step. Nehru, for one, detested such 
talk. Meanwhile Nehru’s efforts to exclude discussion of what many at Bandung saw as the 
                                                      
68 Lyon, Neutralism, p. 38. 
69 Robert Vitalis, “The Graceful and Generous Liberal Gesture: Marking Racism Invisible in 
American International Relations,” Millennium, 29, 2 (September 2000), pp. 331-356.  
70 See enclosure setting out the rationale of the RIIA’s new Board of Studies on Race Relations 
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highest stage of imperialism in the guise of the Communist Information Bureau (or Cominform), 
had failed. State after state refused his entreaties to denounce NATO, SEATO, and the like. His 
rivals would gloat over the first would be leader of the Third World’s failure to dominate the 
conference. 
The British and the American policymakers celebrated their victory at the meeting’s end. But 
they credited it to their successful behind-the-scenes support for their “friends” rather than to their 
own original and wild exaggerations of the forces at play. They would continue to conjure the 
same increasingly intertwined twin phantoms of a third force of colored peoples suffering 
psychological inferiority complexes many more times in the years ahead. For instance, when his 
Joint Chiefs of Staff proposed the use of military force to “break” the renegade ex-client Nasser 
one year later in the run up to the Suez War, Eisenhower said no, fearing that it would recoil 
against the US. Why? Nasser “personified the emotional demands” of Egyptians and others 
peoples who sought not only independence but “to slap the white man down.”71  
There is little gain in the fact that, now, decades later, as the postcolonial theorists return to 
the images that Eisenhower, Eden, Dulles, Godfrey Huggins of Rhodesia and others first used in 
the run up to Bandung, that they cast these in what to them appears a more positive or hopeful 
light.  
 
IV  The Many Roads Leading Into and Out of Belgrade 
The second step is a harder one—it always is—because it requires, in place of the 
exaggerated accounts of metropolitan power and the indistinguishable portraits of Nasser, Nehru, 
and Nkrumah at the head of a global formation, that we recognize the competing national state-
building projects and regional state systemic logics as primary analytical terrain. To give one 
pertinent example, the better explanation for why the Asian-African Conference took place when 
and where it did begins not with a plan to launch the world anti-Cold War movement but to bolster 
Sukarno’s chances in forthcoming elections. The line up of states itself is best explained by the 
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increasing contacts and coordination among the sixteen-state voting bloc at the United Nations 
that had over the previous four or five years emerged to frustrate the dominance of the US and its 
hemispheric allies and to force increased attention on the issues of decolonization and racism. It 
was the performance of Egypt’s ancien régime at the UN circa 1950 that led Tito to reconsider the 
orthodox communist views of western political dependencies years before Nasser would emerge 
on the scene.72 That bloc had grown to 28 states by 1958, the largest single alignment, although 
Kwame Nkrumah announced that a newly independent Ghana would not actually join any group 
organized along interregional lines.73  
Let’s not fool ourselves about the work that is required to learn what we don’t know about 
each of the relevant pre- or post-Bandung meetings. There is for example the remarkable and 
now all but forgotten eight-day-long Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947 with a 
larger list of invitees than Bandung, including Tibet, Armenia, Georgia, Turkmenistan—Nehru was 
then still an admirer of Russian modernization strategies—a delegation of Zionists from Palestine, 
and the Arab League. An additional problem is that, as Clive Christie notes, for decades scholars 
have done little work on “the ideas and debates that engaged the main political actors and 
thinkers of Southeast Asia during the nationalist and anti-colonial era.”74 It may be that the 
varieties of nonalignment then on offer—each leader propagating a unique hybrid, “dynamic 
neutrality,” “positive neutralism,” “uncommitted,” “non-engagement,” and so forth—don’t warrant 
reconsideration, with the possible exceptions of Nehru’s and Tito’s brands. Nkrumah is another 
matter. He wrote prolifically, before but especially after his overthrow and exile in 1966. This body 
                                                      
72 See Alvin Z. Rubenstein’s valuable Yugoslavia and the Non-Aligned World (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press), p 33. A useful summary of the early Egyptian policy positions that 
drew Tito’s attention is found in Rami Ginat, Syria and the Doctrine of Arab Neutralism: From 
Independence to Dependence (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2005), pp. 13-16. 
73 Jan F. Triska and Howard E. Koch, Jr., Asian-African Coalition and International Organization: 
Third Force or Collective Impotence?” Review of Politics, 21, 2 (April 1959), pp. 417-455: 418, 
423-24; Harry Howard, “The Arab-Asian States in the United Nations,” Middle East Journal, 7, 3 
(Summer 1953), pp. 279-292. Howard made the prescient observation that a bloc this size or 
larger across such a large geographic area was unlikely to evolve into a more formal kind of 
alliance akin to the Arab League.  
74 Clive J Christie, Ideology and Revolution in Southeast Asia 1900-1980: Political Ideas of the 
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The Cold War in the Mediterranean Project
The European Institute, Columbia University
DRAFT Working Paper
Do not cite or quote without author’s permission
24
2/8/10 2010 International Sudies Association  DRAFT   
 24 
of work is better understood as a species of neocolonialism theory, similar to the turn taken in 
Sukarno’s writings and speeches in the 1960s. The only problem is that a writer provided by 
Israel’s ambassador to Ghana wrote most of one of them, Africa Must Unite, which raises 
questions about the authorship of the rest.75  Nasser, mired in his own Vietnam-style war in 
Yemen throughout those years, replete with use of napalm and possibly mustard gas, brought out 
no new ghostwritten tract of his own after the 1955 Egypt’s Liberation: Philosophy of the 
Revolution. 
Nehru certainly had tried hardest to root his version, Panscheel or Five Principles of 
international relations (mutual respect for a state’s territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, 
mutual non-interference, equality and mutual benefit, peaceful co-existence), which he unveiled 
before Bandung and promoted during the meeting, in some alleged ancient and Indian “way of 
life…as old as our thought and culture.”76 Ten years earlier Sukarno had unveiled his own Five 
Principles (pancasila) as the ideological basis of the not yet independent state. One of these, 
internationalism (or humanism in some older translations, together with nationalism, democracy, 
social justice, and belief in God), which he originally offered up as an alternative to both “vapid 
cosmopolitanism” and to the “inward-looking, race-oriented nationalism of Europe,” served as 
grounding for his own later advocacy at the UN and other venues for transformation of the 
European-state system into a revolutionary post-colonial world order. He would also more or less 
jettison the idea of nonalignment and its view of a world made by the Cold War in order to 
promote the Third World war against neocolonialism before his overthrow in 1965.77  
The real gains to a revived study of ideas may well be to recover the “indigenous” critiques 
of nonalignment emerging in the 1950s and 1960s.78 Consider just two of the figures that Christie 
includes in an increasingly self confident (if unfortunately specified) “post-anti colonial” current. 
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78 See my “The End of Third Worldism in Egypt Studies,” Arab Studies Journal, 4, 1 (Spring 
1996), pp. 13-33. 
The Cold War in the Mediterranean Project
The European Institute, Columbia University
DRAFT Working Paper
Do not cite or quote without author’s permission
25
2/8/10 2010 International Sudies Association  DRAFT   
 25 
Soetan Sjahrir (1909-1966), founder of the Indonesian socialist party and Sukarno’s first prime 
minister, hated the “self-glorifying and egocentric tone of anti-colonial nationalism,” together with 
the misguided search for intrinsic Asian values to be posed against those of “the West.” It was an 
“outdated mindset.”79 Sjahrir would ultimately face arrest, jail, and death in exile.  The “clearest 
cut case” of this trend, Christie says, is Lee Kuan Yew, prime minister of Singapore between 
1959-1990. Early in his tenure, Lee Kuan Yew was arguing that “the anti-colonial mentality and its 
offshoot, the non-aligned world view” was itself the chief obstacle preventing countries of the 
region from meeting their various internal and external challenges, “shorn of alibis and ideological 
illusions.”80  
What we do know is that none of the main Middle Eastern and Asian proponents of positive 
neutralism, nonalignment, and the like at the time of the Asian-African conference understood the 
idea as simply as political scientist Hans Morgenthau put it a few years later in the New York 
Times Magazine:  “the desire not to be allied with either side in the he cold war.”81 Rather, the 
various strains all combined ideas about alliance formation with hard-to-ground claims to cross-
regional solidarity, which would eventually go by the wayside, support for anti-colonial 
movements and, a bit later, opposition to “neocolonialism,” the promotion of general disarmament 
and the tenets of coexistence, which, despite the claims to non-western and ancient-rootedness 
were mostly already part of the Charter of the United Nations. 
G. H. Jansen, who wanted to salvage the nonalignment idea, peeled it back down to what he 
viewed as its commonsense core, a preference for exercising “an independent judgment on 
questions of foreign policy.” Unfortunately, he lamented, it came to be “viewed incorrectly” as a 
product of the cold war and in opposition to it, and was saddled with various additional 
commitments, including an unconvincing claim about nonalignment’s superior moral power.82 This 
defense may be the one most unconvincing claim in his treasure of a book, since what state’s 
                                                      
79 These are summary statements by Christie, Ideology and Revolution, pp. 70-72, 186. 
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preference isn’t for pursuit of an independent judgment on its foreign policy and what state isn’t 
constrained at the same time by a hierarchical international order? 
In June 1961, delegations from nineteen countries, eight from Africa and nine from Asia, 
together with a team of post Bay of Pigs Cubans, the Yugoslavians, and some Brazilian 
observers, met in Cairo to plan the world’s first nonaligned summit.83 All the invitees represented 
the choices of Tito and Nasser. One of the main goals was to head off Sukarno’s proposal for 
another Asian-African conference. A second Bandung would have reproduced the splits of 1955 
and it would have been hard to involve Nasser’s new, staunch European ally. Simultaneously, 
any conference organized on a regional basis, one of which suddenly included more than thirty 
independent states, would have increased the odds against Nasser’s dominance given, just to 
mention one factor, the dissension he had sowed across Africa in the course of his intervention in 
the Congo crisis of the previous years.  
Nasser led a set of allies that wanted a strict test of admission, what Jansen calls an 
exclusivist position. Nehru reluctantly agreed to participate and by the end of the meeting was 
viewed as an enemy of nonalignment, when really what he opposed was the continued obsession 
with colonialism. With virtually all of Africa either winning its independence or on the verge of 
doing so, colonialism was quickly fading into insignificance, and so the Cold War and some 
alternative to nuclear annihilation were the most important issue to be confronted in the future. 
Nehru pushed for and won, he thought, a more inclusive approach to participation. The delegates 
agreed to appoint a subcommittee to define nonalignment and to draw up a list of acceptable 
countries on that basis, which took two sessions and eleven hours of discussion to arrive at the 
following tautological definition. To qualify as nonaligned 
1. A country should follow an independent policy based on peaceful co-existence and 
non-alignment, or should be showing a trend in favor of such a policy.  
2. It should consistently have supported movements for national independence.  
                                                      
83 There were the two or possibly three “progressive neutralists” Yugoslavia and Guinea, with 
Cuba posing a puzzle, “positive neutralists” Egypt, Ghana, Mali, Indonesia, and Algeria, “non-
aligned” India, Burma, Ceylon, and Afghanistan, “uncommitted” Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Tunisia, and Lebanon, and “disengaged” Cambodia and Laos in Jansen’s recounting, Afro-Asia, 
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3. It should not be a member of multilateral alliances concluded in the context of great 
power conflicts. 
4. If it had conceded military bases these concessions should not have been made in the 
context of great power conflicts. 
5. If it were a member of a bi-lateral or regional defense arrangement, this should not be 
in the context of great power conflicts.84 
The regional rivalries, clientelism, and log rolling that determined the final line up at Belgrade 
deserves highlighting, lest one still imagines the moment as a time when a better, more principled 
form of world order might have come into being. All of the countries present at the Cairo 
preparatory conference would attend Belgrade, although according to the terms worked out in 
committee, four countries—Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Ethiopia, and Yugoslavia—ought to have 
been excluded given the western military bases in the first three and Yugoslavia’s defense 
treaties with NATO countries Greece and Turkey. The tiny island of Cyprus was one of only two 
lucky survivors among the fifteen proposed for consideration although it was still home to the 
base from which the British launched its invasion of Egypt in 1956. The second was Lebanon, 
although Egypt fought hard to exclude it on grounds that it had opposed China’s admission to the 
UN, thus not independent enough to do Nasser’s bidding. Neighboring Jordan didn’t fare as well. 
The organizers voted against It on the grounds that it hosted US military installations, which 
wasn’t true.  
Nehru’s efforts to extend invitations to additional European countries to support his more 
Cold War, less colonialism-focused approach foundered on the choice of Belgrade as a venue. If 
I read Jansen right, Sweden, Finland and Ireland all sent quiet word that invitations would have to 
be rejected to preserve their neutrality. The Cubans were of course allied to the Soviets, but the 
recent thwarted US invasion gained them a pass, and they in turn exercised a veto against a few 
non-favored neighbors, for instance, Costa Rica. Other Latin American states—Argentina, Chile, 
and Mexico—also let organizers know that invitations would be unwelcomed on the grounds that 
the Cubans would be there. Ultimately, Brazil, Bolivia, and Ecuador comprised the three 
additional not-quite full partners in the twenty nine-country meeting in Belgrade, although all of 
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them should have been excluded given that they were bound to the United States in the first Cold 
War defense alliance, the Rio Pact. 
The really important work to be done in the future is on the position of the African states and 
liberation movements in the real as opposed to mythical Bandung and Belgrade meetings, the 
latter, despite the global reimagining of it, still mostly an Asian-African affair. At Bandung, as Colin 
Legum put it, “the African voice was mainly Arab.”85 The Liberian delegates complained bitterly of 
the failure to include them in the committee work on colonialism. Both Adam Clayton Powell, Jr. 
and the American Committee on Africa’s accounts took note of the obvious less than full 
partnership with Asia. The Colombo powers had dropped Nigeria from the list of invitees because 
they hadn’t a clue as to the direction and pace of decolonization there. Six years later, Nigeria still 
wasn’t present. Despite or because of the remarkable continental transformation only one 
additional state, the Congo, was added to the three at Cairo—Somalia, Guinea, and Mali—out of 
the twenty-five self-declared nonaligned countries that had gained independence after Ghana. 
States were one thing, liberation movements another. Nasser and Tito extended invitations to 
nineteen of the latter.  
 
V Spreading Enlightenment and Civilization to the Remotest Depths of the Jungle  
Transnational popular memory is just one more obstacle in the way of a full or at least less 
romantic account of what transpired in and around Bandung, Accra, Cairo, and Belgrade in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s.  
As an Egyptian born political scientist raised in the 1950s, I am a member of a 
generation that was taught to believe the contention of the first Egyptian president, Gamal 
Abdel Nasser, that Egyptian identity was the product of 3 concentric circles: one Arab, the 
second was Islamic and the third was African. This was reinforced by the memory of the 
frequent visits by African leaders, like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana and Modibu Keita of 
Mali who along with Nasser were advocates of African unity and the non-aligned 
movement.86 
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The memory above evokes an argument in Nasser’s little book that is no longer read, but 
that convinced many at the time that he was launching a plan of expansion echoing Hitler’s, not 
least for the unfortunate reference to Egypt’s boundaries on the one hand and its “living space” 
on the other. African nationalists paid particular attention to Nasser’s paternalist (or worse) 
approach to its position astride the “Dark Continent” where the people there naturally looked to 
Egypt, and Nasser in return would support, with all his might, “the spread of enlightenment and 
civilization to the remotest depths of the jungle.”87 
What of course wasn’t taught then nor now is that Nkrumah and his remarkable advisor on 
African Affairs, the exiled Trinidadian socialist and Pan-Africanist George Padmore viewed 
Nasser as one of the chief obstacles in the way of African unity plans, steeling themselves 
against the Egyptian push deeper into the so-called “third circle” as he found his bid for 
hegemony in the Arab arena thwarted.88 Nasser represented a problem both in terms of his turn 
to the Soviets for arms, thus providing them entry into the nonaligned zone, and for his anything 
but peaceful coexistence with a key ally in the Bandung years, Israel.  The ties with the latter 
country went back to pre-independence days, via another close Nkrumah ally, James Markham a 
Ghanaian resident in Rangoon who worked at the Anti-Colonial Bureau of the Asian Socialist 
Conference.  Markham, distrusted by both British and US intelligence agencies, was the Gold 
Coast’s second delegate to Bandung. 
Nasser and Nkrumah waged what amounted to a “soft power” war in 1957-1959 by way of 
rival conferences and claims to defense of the “Bandung Spirit.” In March 1957 Kwame Nkrumah 
announced that Accra would soon host the first Pan-African Nationalist Conference. Nkrumah’s 
papers reveal that Padmore had begun promoting the idea of a “conference to match Bandung on 
                                                      
87 Gamal Abdul Nasser [as rendered in the text], Egypt’s Liberation: The Philosophy of the 
Revolution, Introduction by Dorothy Thompson (Washington, DC: Public Affairs Press, 1955), pp. 
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88 For Padmore’s views see James R. Hooker, Black Revolutionary: George Padmore’s Path 
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an African scale with Asians as observers” back in August 1955.89 The newly African-identified 
Egyptian responded with a plan of his own to host the first Afro-Asian People’s Solidarity 
Conference. US intelligence sources considered it a communist front organization.90 Padmore 
saw it as an effort to subvert Nkrumah’s bid for leadership on the continent. His reaction was 
roughly the same as Nehru’s back in 1955 when the same front organizations operating then as 
the Asian Solidarity Committee rushed to hold its own Bandung in New Delhi a week before the 
Asian-African Conference.91 
Nkrumah and Padmore upped the ante, rushing to hold the rival 1958 Conference of 
Independent African States in Accra on April 15, “in order to keep for Black Africa priority over the 
Afro-Asian movement in Cairo.”92 The prime minister of Ghana also entered a marriage of 
diplomatic convenience, as even his son admits, with Fatiha Rizk, a young Egyptian Copt whom 
he had never met and with whom he shared no language in common.93 By the end of the year 
Ghana had also founded it own rival All African People’s Organization, which held a founding 
conference in late December organized chiefly by Padmore.94 And in contrast to Cairo, Nkrumah 
opened the meeting up to Americans, who attended in force: Shirley Graham Du Bois, Paul 
Robeson, Detroit Congressman Charles Diggs, Maida Springer, political scientist Richard Sklar, 
then a Ford Foundation fellow, and Alphaeus Hunton, among many others. George M Houser, 
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director of the American Committee on Africa, wrote a long report that included a section titled 
“Accra vs. Cairo.” He took note of the intense competition between Nasser and Nkrumah, the 
widespread suspicion of Egypt within many of the Sub-Saharan African delegations, and the 
belief that when Nkrumah spoke of the fact that imperialism “may come to us yet in different 
guise—not necessarily from Europe,” it was Nasser in particular that he had in his sights.95 The 
maverick Howard historian and one-time Pan-Africanist, Rayford Logan, argued much the same 
at the time, reporting the testimony of black African students in Cairo who suffered discrimination 
because of their “race and color,” and describing “Nasserism” as one of the forces along with 
white supremacy, black supremacy, and communism propelling Africa toward a crisis.96  
Israeli foreign minister Golda Meir was Ghana’s guest on a state visit at the time of the 
conference. Padmore arranged what turned out to be a rancorous meeting for her with Algerians 
and others.97 Other leading figures in the Labor party government traveled to Accra as well, 
including Moshe Dayan, who advised on building the Ghanaian armed forces after Nkrumah 
turned down Nasser’s offer of aid. Nothing captures the essence of the moment best than the 
launching of Ghana’s Black Star Line, using the name of Marcus Garvey’s United Negro 
Improvement Association’s failed flagship venture of 1919. Back then Garvey had pointed to 
Zionism as a model for Pan-Africanists to emulate, and while Padmore saw post-1945 Pan 
Africanism as distinct from “Black Zionism,” he also counseled African nationalists to learn from 
the way the Jews had built their state.98 Zim Navigation, Israel’s national shipping company, 
owned forty percent of the new Black Star Line, and for years Nasser blocked Ghanaian ships 
from using the Suez Canal. 
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Nkrumah’s strategy of balancing against Nasser (“little non-alignment”) did not survive the 
sudden death of Padmore in September 1959, the eclipse of Kojo Botsio and others of its 
supporters, Nasser’s greater influence in the circles that Nkrumah would need to win to bring his 
dream of continental unity to fruition, and Israel’s own success in replicating its Ghana strategy 
with a dozen new African leaders, including Tom Mboya, Julius Neyere, Kenneth Kaunda and 
most of the Brazzaville group. Even as Nkrumah tried bandwagoning (“big non-alignment”) for a 
while at and following the Cairo and Belgrade meetings of 1961, he continued to rely on the 
Israeli embassy for intelligence on Egyptian operations across Africa. 
Israel’s leaders engaged with their new secret weapon against Egypt as we might expect 
and responded in time honored fashion when their client proved, as clients usually do, hard to 
coopt. An early message from David Ben Gurion to Nkrumah assured him that “though we belong 
to the white race we Jews have suffered…at the hands of the white peoples.”  Yet, when 
Nkrumah proposed to mediate the conflict with the Arabs, Ben Gurion laughed at his 
“pretensions.” What did the Lion of Israel’s agent in Ghana report back as Nkrumah continued to 
ask for aid even as he questioned aspects of Israeli foreign policy? He has come “unhinged.”  
What we don’t know and will likely never know is what Nasser and his clique were saying about 
their own would be client that nonetheless worked hard for a time to keep the Arab-Israeli dispute 
off of the Pan-Africa agenda. 
 
 VI “The Glorious Era of Nasser and Nkrumah Is Sadly Over”99 
Both students of the cold war and of ideas have their work cut out for them, because, as far 
as I can tell, what actually went on in a dozens of hurriedly built new national capitals and in the 
ex-palaces and hotels turned people’s conference halls has been distorted in so many 
dimensions that what we find today are fun-house mirror versions of the past. I have tried to 
correct a few of the distortions here, using records I began to consult four years ago and that 
quickly made clear how little we actually know or, better, how much we have forgot. Now, having 
                                                      
99 Gamal Nkrumah, “Forward Ever,” Al-Ahram Weekly.  
The Cold War in the Mediterranean Project
The European Institute, Columbia University
DRAFT Working Paper
Do not cite or quote without author’s permission
33
2/8/10 2010 International Sudies Association  DRAFT   
 33 
read more records from 1955-1959, I would advise returning to the then contemporary political 
analyses and newspaper accounts and making better use of the now voluminous declassified 
records. We should probably heed the warning of historians too about the pitfalls of origins 
stories, particularly since in the one told about Bandung the thing never actually existed.  
The 1955 Asian-African Conference did not launch a movement of states, let alone peoples, 
in support of “decolonization,” a term that Padmore denounced for its origins in communist 
doctrine, preferring instead transfer of power. It is true, however, that if anything even loosely 
united the twenty-nine mostly self-identified Arab and I won’t even begin to try to sort Asian 
delegations it was the belief that the colonial powers should go out of business sooner rather than 
later. The 1961 meeting of Non-Aligned States and Heads of Governments was not a follow up to 
Bandung or its extension. It was its rival.  
The tendency to imagine that neutralism-morphed-into-non-alignment kicks off in Asia and 
then gradually makes its way west to the Mediterranean via Belgrade ought to be rethought. The 
first scholarly work on neutralism in the early years of the cold war is a case study of mid-1940s 
France when Le Monde was a recognized exponent of neutralist thought.100 Others worked on 
England “Labor Left.”101 Daniel Lerner dissected British and French neutralist trends and 
communications networks in 1952.102 Tito’s links to Asian like-thinking states goes back to the 
early 1950s as well. Milovan Djilas led the Yugoslavian delegation to the first Asian Socialist 
Conference in Rangoon in 1953 as part of Tito’s strategy to gain allies in the UN and pursue 
prospects for a “third bloc,” all talk of which was banned by Nehru at Bandung two years later! 
The Israelis who also identified as neutralist pursued more or less the same strategy as 
Yugoslavia in Rangoon.103 It is not clear why we think the circuits of an idea that matters, 
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however easy or hard it is to pin down, should track the obsessions and foreign policy crises of 
John Foster Dulles, which is what the story does today, not least because of a need to believe in 
the Bandung Spirit. 
Finally the main story arc needs adjusting because Bandung comes toward the end of the 
first phase of the Cold War although it had little if anything to do with its end. The death of Stalin 
led to a new round of theorizing and prediction about change in the tight bipolar system (or, if you 
prefer, the limits of the capacity of either or both of the rival powers to expand the size of their 
rival empires). Padmore offered up one slightly over zealous version in his running 
correspondence on tactics and strategy with his protégé.  
Now that the Iron Curtain is down and the honeymoon season has started 
between the Eastern and the Western white folk, the Government must send a 
mission to see and get ideas from Jugoslavia, where Tito has copied some of the 
Russian tricks and beaten them at the game. After all, he is the American “darling,” so 
going there is not going “red.” 104 
That a détente had emerged in the wake of the Berlin and Bay of Pigs crises is undeniable, 
witness international relations scholars launching the first of their now regular and overblown 
debates about the prospects for a multipolar system coming into being, while communist 
theoreticians spoke about polycentrism.105 Yugoslavia’s own analysis of international affairs took 
note of the divisions inside various camps that reflected this change. The problem, as Jansen 
observed, is that it grew increasingly difficult to argue that nonalignment was the only way forward 
to coexistence and disarmament. Tito seems to have grown increasingly mystical about these 
matters.106 India bailed out of the coalition a year or two after Belgrade. So did China, which 
tested its first nuclear weapon in October 1964.  
Scholars today conflate the movements and thinkers beginning to promote various versions 
of we-now-confront-the-newest-and-most-insidious-form-of-Western-intervention-yet or 
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“neocolonialism” in the 1960s both with the Asian-African conference in 1955, where no one was 
making any arguments remotely like it, and with Belgrade. At Bandung the focus had been 
liberating the colonial dependencies and protectorates. “By 1962 African expressions of anti-
colonialism, were generally much stronger than Asian because there were so many more 
`vestiges’ of (Western) `colonialism’ in Africa.”107 There were those who tried to hold a follow up 
to the 1955 Asian-African Conference but it never happened, not least because the divisions at 
the first were real, and no grounds for sustaining that coalition existed on the basis of color, 
coexistence, or neocolonialism. Instead, Nkrumah and others pushed forward with their idea of a 
continent-wide Organization of African Unity, while at the UN African states emerged as a self-
contained bloc.  The erection of the larger Association of Southeast Asian Nations in 1967 on the 
foundation of the 1961 three-country (Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand) Association of 
Southeast Asia can be seen as a rejection of the radical turn in thought and disastrous economic 
programs that men like Sukarno (and Nkrumah in Ghana, Nasser in Egypt and others) adopted in 
the 1960s. 
Those concerned with theorizing the role of race in the contemporary international order 
might return to Romulo’s speech at Bandung with profit, because he warned there of the dangers 
or racialism in their own countries. In the run up to the meeting, British Foreign Office argued that 
there were no natural grounds for its African dependencies to attend and so should discourage 
“Asian countries in the idea cherished by many of them that they are the natural saviors and 
champions of the Africans against the white man.”108 Nehru was singled out for his meddling 
where India had no real interests, forgetting the existence of diaspora communities not only in 
South Africa but also in Uganda, Kenya, and Tanzania. More than a decade earlier, In a 
remarkable address, “Race, Colonies, and Imperialism,” to the National Peace Conference in 
June 1943 Howard’s Rayford Logan also pushed beyond the familiar hierarchy of white overlords 
and colonial subjects to argue that all forms of “inter-minority oppression” needed to be opposed 
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in the future. His examples included the conflicts between Serbs and Croats, Indians and Blacks 
in South Africa and Kenya, Chinese in Java, and the Mulatto aristocracy in Haiti.109  
The waves of violence, expropriations, and expulsions witnessed across Asia and Africa in 
the 1960s and 1970s against Lebanese, Indians, Greeks, Chinese, and so on were licensed by 
the degenerate turn in so-called progressive thought.110 Theories of neocolonialism associated 
with Sukarno, Nkrumah, and others purported to identify various “anti-nations” within the nation 
advancing the interests of western imperialism after independence.111 It might be the one stark 
binary of the cold war still in place today. 
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